Niger\u2019s coup last month was the eighth military takeover in Africa since 2020. Most occurred in West African states, which have faced rising extremist violence for years. Niger was among them.<\/p>\n
Affiliates and offshoots of both al-Qaida and the Islamic State found fertile ground in impoverished and neglected communities in Nigeria, Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger. They\u2019ve been met by armies supplied and strengthened by Western powers hoping to stem the tide of terrorism in the region.<\/p>\n
The United States and France were the primary partners, providing weapons, military education, combat training, intelligence and direct counterterrorism operations for more than a decade. Security partners have spent billions of dollars, but violence has only grown.<\/p>\n
Across Africa, terrorist violence has increased by 300% during that time. The death toll across West Africa was up by 75% last year and looks set to keep increasing. In Burkina Faso and Mali, the military leaders who recently seized control claimed to be doing so to restore order, yet both countries have seen more violence since.<\/p>\n
But Niger was starting to peel away from the pack. In a dangerous region where conflict is on the rise and democracy on the backfoot, Niger was taking small steps the other way.<\/p>\n
Niger had its first-ever democratic transition of power in 2021. President Mohamed Bazoum spent the next two years recalibrating the country\u2019s approach toward dealing with insecurity.<\/p>\n
I shouldn\u2019t overstate the successes. They were small and, clearly, reversible. But they represented a shift in priorities that seemed to be gaining ground.<\/p>\n
Bazoum maintained a strong security partnership with the United States, but he also understood that military solutions were insufficient to address the country\u2019s instability. The population\u2019s grievances were real and their needs unmet. Many were politically and economically excluded. The government\u2019s armed forces were often implicated in abuses against civilians themselves. This all made for receptive audiences when insurgent groups came recruiting.<\/p>\n
This reality isn\u2019t lost on the United States, which routinely invokes the \u201cthree Ds\u201d of diplomacy, development and defense, in recognition that long-term stability requires a holistic approach. But thanks to a gross disparity in resources and a national security culture that places greater stock in security solutions than soft power, U.S. military tools and assistance overshadow, and often undermine, efforts that can improve governance.<\/p>\n
Western cooperation has focused on strengthening security services. While that approach sounds logical, it can undermine the relative power of civilian governments in countries with weak institutions and government services. This can make it harder for them to address the underlying grievances that help fuel insurgencies. In some cases, it even strengthens the military\u2019s case for taking control. None of this is good for long-term stability.<\/p>\n
For years, Niger prioritized its partners\u2019 security objectives to the detriment of democratic accountability. Bazoum sought to rebalance that approach, with greater focus on improving government services to the most marginalized. His government engaged those who had joined extremist groups to determine what was driving them. He promised dialogue and reconciliation, even inviting emissaries of the Islamic State-Sahel to join local peace talks. Violence has since declined in those areas. He\u2019s made concessions, like freeing prisoners and agreeing not to attack groups that agree to do the same.<\/p>\n
The coup leaders criticized this as weak. After all, labeling insurgents as terrorists can leave little room for compromise.<\/p>\n
But this approach had promise. Military responses have rarely succeeded in destroying terrorist groups \u2014 only about 7% of cases historically. More often, success comes from a combination of policing, intelligence and political inclusion to address grievances that fuel insurgency.<\/p>\n
There were signs it could have been working too. Fewer people were killed in Niger in the first six months of 2023 than in the same period of any year since 2018. Civilian deaths by state armed forces were also down.<\/p>\n
Some of West Africa\u2019s coastal states are taking a similar approach to preempt a rise in extremism within their borders. For example, C\u00f4te d\u2019Ivoire has focused on improving infrastructure and basic services in border communities, and this appears to have slowed the advance of terrorism there.<\/p>\n
But Niger\u2019s powerful security forces might have seen this rebalance as a threat too. Bazoum was reportedly curbing the authority of army commanders and had launched anti-corruption programs that created enemies. He was also scrutinizing the budget of the presidential guard force, whose leader, Gen. Abdourahamane Tchiani, led the coup.<\/p>\n
Military leaders, empowered by years of a military-first approach to Niger\u2019s struggles, didn\u2019t want to cede ground to a civilian-led approach. Maybe they were convinced they were better suited to the task, or maybe they just refused to have their control diminished.<\/p>\n
It\u2019s impossible to know if Bazoum would have succeeded, but extremist groups will undoubtedly take advantage of Niger\u2019s political instability. So this coup will likely make matters worse in a country where things might have been getting better.<\/p>\n
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Elizabeth Shackelford is a senior fellow on U.S. foreign policy with the Chicago Council on Global Affairs. She was previously a U.S. diplomat and is the author of \u201cThe Dissent Channel: American Diplomacy in a Dishonest Age.\u201d<\/em><\/p>\n ___<\/p>\n